Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1

Article 4

11-1-1941

Recent Decision
James H. Neu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James H. Neu, Recent Decision, 17 Notre Dame L. Rev. 70 (1941).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol17/iss1/4

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

RECENT DECISION
ABSOLTUTE LIABILITY OR NEGLIGENCE?-A recent Indiana Appellate
Court decision ' creates some innovations in the law of Torts which are
worthy of comment and criticism. There is evidence in the record to sustain the following facts: That the appellants are the Wabash Railroad;
that employees of the appellants started a fire on the appellant's right
of way; that some 160 feet south of where said fire was started was
located United States Highway No. 24, which highway ran parallel with
the appellant's right of way; that the wind was blowing from the tracks
toward said highway; and that heavy smoke clouds from said fire covered the highway at the time of the accident in which the appellee was
injured; that at the time of the accident no one was flagging traffic on
said highway at either end of the smoke cloud; that the said highway
was a heavily traveled paved highway; that after the accident in which
the appellee was injured, the fire was extinguished; that on the day of
the accident the appellee was traveling in a westerly direction on said
highway; that when the appellee entered the smoke cloud the appellee
slowed down to a speed of 3 or 4 miles per hour and proceeded at this
speed into the smoke cloud; that while the appellee was traveling
through the snoke cloud, the appellee's car was struck in the rear by
an automobile driven by one Catherine Hively who was traveling in
the same direction as the appellee; that the appellee saw no car approaching from behind when the appellee entered the smoke cloud; that
the appellee turned on his dimmers when he entered the smoke cloud;
that the appellee never came to a complete stop before entering the
smoke cloud.
The appellants make the following contentions:
1. That the evidence is sufficient to show actionable negligence, and
that the smoke over the highway was a mere condition, the creation
of which was not negligence.
2. That the sole proximate cause of the injuries to the appellee
was the negligence of the driver of the car which struck the appellee.
3. That the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence, as a
matter of law, in failing to wait in a place of safety when view of the
highway was obscured by a temporary or transitory obstruction.
Thus, at first blush, it is apparent that the appellee drafts his complaint on the theory that the Wabash Railroad, the appellants, were negligent in permitting smoke to escape onto a public highway; and the
appellants defend on the grounds of no negligence, contributory negligence of the appellee; and a lack of causation to attach liability to
the appellants.
1 Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 34 N. E. 2d 943 (Ind. App., 1941).
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The court held for the appellee on the theory of negligence on the
part of the appellants.
With the above thoughts in mind, let us review the processes of reasoning which the court uses to reach its conclusion.
Discussing the third contention of the appellants, which in substance, contends that the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence,
the court finds that the appellee was not guilty of contributory negligence. To support this conclusion, the court shows that the question
of contributory negligence in a case of this kind is a question for the
jury to decide on the facts presented. To support this conclusion, a
California case of similar facts is quoted, "The authorities in California
and elsewhere do not seem to support this contention. It is almost uniformly the rule that whether the conduct of a person driving into smoke,
fog, dust, or mist offends the doctrine of ordinary care is ordinarily a
question to be determined by the court or jury." 2 Another case to the
same effect is cited. 3
In disposing of the second contention of the appellants, to-wit: That
the sole and proximate cause of the injuries to the appellee was the
negligence of the driver of the car which struck the appellee, the court
says, "Had it not been for the smoke upon the highway the accident
would not have happened. The negligence of the appellants was, therefore, one of the concurring causes which produced the injury and without which the accident would not have occurred. . .-4 The court also
finds that the act of Catherine Hively was not an intervening independent act of a third person which broke the chain of causation. 5
Thus, the court has disposed of the second, and third contentions of
the appellants and in so doing, the court has held that the appellants
have committed certain acts which acts should properly be submitted
to the jury for decision as to whether or not said acts amount to negligence on the appellants' part. Thus, so far, the case hinges on the
concept of negligence.
But, turning to a discussion of the first contention of the appellants, one is aware that the court reaches a complete state of confusion
in regard to the concept of negligence and the concept of strict liability.
The first contention of the appellants is that the evidence is insufficient to show actionable negligence, and that the smoke on the
highway was a mere condition, the creation of which is not negligence.
In an attempt to prove that the appellants were guilty of actionable
Bixby v. Pickwick Stage Co., 131 Cal. App. 739, 21 P. 2d 972 ,(1933).
Pisarke v. Wisconsin Tunnel and Construction Co., 174 Wis. 377, 183 N. W.
164 (1921).
4 Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 34 N. E. 2d 943 (Ind.App., 1941).
5 Evansville and I. R. Co. v. Allen, 34 Ind. App. 636, 73 N. E. 630 (1905).
2

3
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negligence, the court cites numerous cases, namely, Rock Oil Company
v. Braumbaugh,6 Wright v. Compton,7 Ft. Wayne Cooperage Co. v.
Page,8 and Island Coal Company v. Clummitt.9
From the Rock Oil Co. v. Braumbaugh 10 case, the appellate court
takes the following quotation, "One is entitled to reasonable use of his
property even if such use incidentally injures the property of his
neighbor, but liability for an injury arises when it is caused by such
(unreasonable) use of one's property as might reasonably have been
anticipated to result in damage to the person or property of others in
the vicinity. Both our courts of last resort have approved the rule declared in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) L. R. 1 Exchequer,
265, 278, to the effect that the person who for his own purposes brings
on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to cause injury and damages to the property of others if it escapes must keep
it at his peril, and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequences of its escape." This
quotation places recovery on the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, but
the court makes this quotation as authority to show that the appellants
are guilty of actionable negligence. It becomes necessary, therefore,
to ascertain if the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher allows recovery on
the theory of negligence.
The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher illustrates the rule of strict
liability or liability without fault. But, liability is not hinged on the
theory of wilful acts by the defendant. One of our leading authorities
speaking on Rylands v. Fletcher says, "Many activities there are
which create situations frought with some danger to others, but because of the general social utility of the activities, the risk is not regarded as an unreasonable one. There is, accordingly, neither ethical
nor social fault in the carrying on of such activities. If, therefore, the
actor conducts such enterprises with due care, taking all reasonable
precautions to avoid harm to others, he is entirely innocent in spite
of the fact that harm of the kind anticipated actually occurs as a result of the activity.
"Where such dangers from socially desirable conduct are especially
great, or where, when they do result in harm, the innocent victims
thereof are especially numerous, or where the person carrying on the
activity is greatly benefited therefrom in comparison to the loss to the
injured person, or where the actor is in a peculiarly advantageous position to administer the risk by distributing the loss or passing it on to
others or to the public, the law for some or all of these reasons has im6

69 Ind. App. 640, 108 N. E. 260 (1915).

7
8

53 Ind. 337 (1876).
170 Ind. 585, 84 N. E. 145, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 946 (1908).
19 Ind. App. 21,'49 N. E. 38 (1897).
69 Ind. App. 640, 108 N. E. 260 (1915).
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posed the risk of such losses upon the person causing them, irrespective of any fault on his part. The problem is purely one of allocating
a probable or inevitable loss in such a manner as to entail the least
hardship upon any individual and thus to preserve the social and
economic resources of the community.
"In this type of situation, the actor conducts his activities at his
peril, that is, at the peril of making good the anticipated loss if it
actually materializes. The fact that he engages in the activity in
question is sufficient to make him liable in damages if other necessary
requisites of legal liability are present. From considerations of social
expediency, his conduct is sufficient to constitute a basis of liability
in tort if harm ensues. Such conduct is, therefore, "tortious" - not in
the sense that it is unethical, unlawful or culpable, but because it is
a type of conduct indulged under conditions which, as a pure matter
of social engineering, may become the basis of liability in the event
that it is the legal cause of harm to persons not disqualified to recover
therefor, and if the conduct is not, for some exceptional reason,
privileged. The principle of strict or absolute liability, varying as it
does from the usual policy of the law that moral or social fault is
a necessary characteristic of conduct which may constitute the basis of
tort liability, is necessarily of somewhat limited extent." 11 In order to
qualify for protection under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher certain things must prevail, the harm which has been created must be of
a class or type which the rule protects against; the party injured must
have been designed to be protected, and the harm must have occurred
so that it would not be unfair to hold the defendant. Does the principal case of Pitcairn v. Whiteside 12 come under these qualifications?
Fire or smoke is one of those hazards which comes under the rule.' 3
Adjoining land owners are the main class of persons protected under
the rule.' 4 Can a public highway be construed in the same light as
adjoining land? Perhaps so by an extension of the doctrine. The court
decided 'that the defendant's acts were the proximate cause of the injury, so it would not be unfair to hold the defendant liable even though
it could be construed that there was no negligence since the injury was
caused by fire and smoke. Thus, one can see that by an extension of the
Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine, the court might possibly allow recovery on the doctrine of strict liability as set out in Rylands v. Fletcher.
However, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher is the antithesis of recovery on the theory of negligence. Consequently, the doctrine of strict
liability quoted above to prove actionable negligence is incorrect and
without authority.
11 Harper on Torts (1933), par. 155.
12 34 N. E. 2d 943 (Ind. App., 1941).
13 Harper on Torts (1933), par. 160. Schoff v. Coyle, 121 Okl. 228, 249 P.
947 (1921).
14 Harper on Torts (1933), par. 160.
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The Indiana Appellate Court next cites the case of Wright v. Compton 15 to show that the appellant was guilty of actionable negligence.
The court in Wright v. Comp'ton 16 says, "The question involved is not
one of negligence on the part of the defendants. The act charged against
them is, in itself, unlawful - not the act of blasting the quarry rock,
but the act of casting fragments of rock upon the plaintiff, to his injury.
When the act, in itself, is unlawful, it is immaterial whether it is done
ignorantly, negligently, or purposely, except in the measure of damages.
Every person must so use his property, and exercise his rights as not to
injure the property or restrict the rights of others." The court 17 further cites with approval from a leading case,' 8 "A man may prosecute
such business as he chooses upon his premises, but he cannot erect a
nuisance to the annoyance of the adjoining proprietor, even for the
purpose of lawful trade. If he cannot construct the work without the
adoption of such means, he must abandon that mode of using his property, or be held responsible for all damages resulting therefrom. He will
not be permitted to accomplish a legal object in an unlawful manner."
The ground for recovery in the case of Wright v. Compton 19 is on the
nuisance theory of strict liability.
Strict liability for a nuisance is based on the old real property
maxim, Sic utere tzro ut alienun non laedes (so use your own as not
to injure others). 2o Thus, if one uses his property in such a manner
that he causes injury to another or his property a nuisance may have
been created and the possible creator thereof is held to strict liability.
One of our leading authorities says, "It is to be observed that the idea
of an 'unreasonable user' of property as used in the nuisance cases
is different in one important respect from the concept of an 'unreasonable risk' as used in negligence cases. The latter concept conveys
the idea of a foreseeable threat of harm created by the conduct of the
actor of such a character that a reasonable person would not expose
others thereto. In the case of nuisance, an 'unreasonable user' does
not necessarily imply an anticipation of harm that is unreasonable.
The unreasonableness of the use of his property on the part of the
actor is determined largely by the character and extent of the harm
caused rather than that threatened. If he has so used his property as
to produce unreasonable harm to his neighbors, he may be liable as
for nuisance, irrespective of any element of unreasonable foreseeability
of such harm before it actually occurred. A nuisance may thus consist
in the use of property which causes an unreasonable amount of harm,
15

53 Ind. 337 (1876).

16

53 Ind. 337 (1876).

Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337 (1876).
18 Hay v. The Cohoes Company, 2 Comst. 159, 51 Am. Dec. 279 (1849).
19 53 Ind. 337 (1876).
20 Niagara Oil Co. v. Jackson, 48 Ind. App. 238, 91 N. E. 825 (1911).
17
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although the actor had in no sense created an unreasonable risk, as
that idea is developed in negligence." 21
It is again evident from a review of the nuisance theory that the
court erred by quoting from a case decided on the nuisance theory
to prove that the appellants are guilty of actionable negligence.
Also, if the court in the principal case 22 sought to hold the apinto
pellant to strict liability there would have been no need to go
23
the concepts of contributory negligence or negligent conduct.
A third case quoted 24 by the Appellate Court to show that the appellants were guilty of actionable negligence is in point when the court
says. "One may not always conduct a lawful business on his premises
as he pleases. The law requires that everyone in the use and enjoyment
of his property shall have regard for the rights of others, and will not
allow him to set up or prosecute a business on his own land in a way
that is calculated to, or in fact does, materially or injuriously affect the
rights of adjoining owners, or that substantially or harmfully interferes with or injures those rightfully traveling on an adjoining highway."
Also, the Island Coal Co. v. Clemmitt 25 is decided on the theory
of negligence as the court says, "The entire pleading shows that the
appellant was negligent in producing a condition of things through
which as a natural result the appellee suffered the injury charged. If
the appellant's wrong which caused the particular injury which forms
the basis of the action may not be called strictly speaking, the maintenance of a nuisance, and if the cause of action should more properly
be said to be based upon negligence, we think that, though the meaning is not made as clear as desirable, it is sufficiently shown that there
was a want of due care for the safety of persons rightfully using the
highway, and a negligent exposure of such persons to peril from the
cause through which the appellee was injured." Here, the court is
liberal in allowance of recovery but the court goes into detail to explain why recovery is allowed and on what theories.
In the principal case 26 the court, in the proof of a single fact; towit: That the appellants are guilty of actionable negligence have cited
with approval quotations from cases which quotations predicate recovery on three separate and distinct concepts, namely, the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher, the nuisance theory and negligence. The latter
is the only sound predicate for proof that the appellants are guilty of
Harper on Torts (1933), par. 182.
Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 34 N. E. 2d 943 (Ind.App., 1941).
23 Harper on Torts (1933), par. 193.
24 Ft. Wayne Cooperage Co. v. Page, 170 Ind. 585, 84 N. E. 145, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 946 (1908).
25 Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 34 N. E. 2d 943 (Ind.App., 1941).
26 Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 34 N. E. 2d 943 (Ind.App., 1941).
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